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The attentional blink reflects the impaired ability to identify the 2nd of 2 targets presented in close
succession—a phenomenon that is generally thought to reflect a fundamental cognitive limitation.
However, the fundamental nature of this impairment has recently been called into question by the
counterintuitive finding that task-irrelevant mental activity improves attentional blink performance
(C. N. L. Olivers & S. Nieuwenhuis, 2005). The present study found a reduced attentional blink when
participants concurrently performed an additional memory task, viewed pictures of positive affective
content, or were instructed to focus less on the task. These findings support the hypothesis that the
attentional blink is due to an overinvestment of attentional resources in stimulus processing, a suboptimal
processing mode that can be counteracted by manipulations promoting divided attention.
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The human visual system is limited in the amount of informa-
tion it can process across time, as has become apparent from
research exploring the temporal dynamics of visual attention.
Using the rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm, this
research has found that the detection of the second of two targets
(T2) within a stream of distractors is impaired when T2 is pre-
sented within about 500 ms of the first target (T1; e.g., Chun &
Potter, 1995; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992; see also Kahne-
man, Beatty, & Pollack, 1967). To characterize this phenomenon,
Raymond et al. (1992) coined the term attentional blink. It is as if
attention is temporarily unavailable for new input when earlier
relevant visual information is being processed. Converging evi-
dence from several studies has indicated that the attentional blink
occurs quite late in the information-processing stream. For exam-
ple, participants can pick up on the semantic identity of a “blinked”
item, even though they cannot report on it (e.g., Luck, Vogel, &
Shapiro, 1996; Martens, Wolters, & Van Raamsdonk, 2002). Fur-
thermore, studies using cross-modal stimulus presentation have
shown that processing of visual information can suffer from an
attentional blink induced by an auditory target and vice versa, a
finding that suggests a central processing limit (Arnell & Jolicoeur,
1999; Dell’Acqua, Turatto, & Jolicoeur, 2001). The relatively late
locus of the blink is also suggested by masking studies. Masking
of the targets is crucial for the occurrence of an attentional blink,
but the findings indicate that simultaneous integration masks,
which corrupt the visual input at a lower level, are less successful
than subsequent interruption masks, which appear to substitute for
the target at a higher level of processing (Brehaut, Enns, & Di Lollo,
1999; Dell’Acqua, Pascali, Jolicoeur, & Sessa, 2003; Giesbrecht & Di
Lollo, 1998; Grandison, Ghirardelli, & Egeth, 1997; Seiffert & Di
Lollo, 1997; but see Giesbrecht, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2003).
Various explanations of the attentional blink have been pro-
posed (Chun & Potter, 1995; Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994;
Giesbrecht & Di Lollo, 1998; Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua, 1998;
Nieuwenhuis, Gilzenrat, Holmes, & Cohen, 2005; Raymond et al.,
1992; Seiffert & Di Lollo, 1997; Shapiro & Raymond, 1994;
Vogel, Luck, & Shapiro, 1998), but they all stress the limited-
capacity nature of attentional processing as the main determinant.
For example, Chun and Potter (1995) proposed a two-stage theory.
In the first stage, items are processed up to a relatively high-level
short-term representation (including conceptual or semantic acti-
vation, and hence often referred to as conceptual short-term mem-
ory; Potter, 1993). This initial representation is vulnerable to
interference, and a second stage is required to transform (or con-
solidate) it into the more durable form of memory required for the
generation of a response. However, this second stage is limited in
capacity, and when it is occupied by T1, T2 suffers. Similarly,
Raymond, Shapiro, and Arnell (1995) and Shapiro and Raymond
(1994) proposed that multiple items from the RSVP stream may
enter a visual short-term memory buffer. Within visual short-term
memory, the items compete for subsequent retrieval, causing T2 to
suffer from interference. This competition is biased by limited-
capacity attentional weighting, with the items being assigned dif-
ferent weights depending on their temporal position and similarity
to the targets. When T1 takes up too many of these resources (i.e.,
is assigned too strong a weight), T2 may easily be overridden by
one of the distractors or may not even be represented at all in
visual short-term memory.
The Beneficial Effects of Concurrent Task-Irrelevant
Mental Activity on the Attentional Blink
An important (implicit) assumption underlying previous theo-
retical accounts is that the attentional blink reflects a fundamental,
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unavoidable processing limitation that is exposed when the system
is faced with the computational challenges posed by the RSVP
paradigm. However, we have recently reported evidence that chal-
lenges this assumption by indicating that the size of the attentional
blink is modulated by the general mental state of the observer
(Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005). The evidence suggests that in the
context of the RSVP paradigm, concentrating hard is a suboptimal
processing mode that promotes rather than prevents the occurrence
of the processing limitations reflected in the attentional blink.
In one experimental condition, we instructed participants to
actively think about their holidays or the shopping requirements
for a meal with friends while performing an attentional blink task
involving the identification of two digits within a stream of letters
(Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005). The importance of the attentional
blink task was not mentioned. Surprisingly, T2 identification im-
proved significantly (by 10%–15%) relative to a control condition
in which participants received the standard instruction to concen-
trate on the task at hand. In another experimental condition,
participants were required to listen to a rhythmic tune while
performing the attentional blink task. In one version, they had the
additional task of detecting a yell occasionally present in the tune.
Again, T2 performance improved considerably, to the extent that
the attentional blink almost disappeared.1
At first sight, limited-capacity theories may seem able to explain
these results by assuming that fewer resources were allocated to T1
in the free association and music conditions. Various studies have
shown that the fewer the processing resources required for (or
assigned to) T1, the weaker the attentional blink for T2 (see Chun
& Potter, 1995, Table 1; Seiffert & Di Lollo, 1997; Shore,
McLaughlin, & Klein, 2001; see also Hommel, Schmitz, Shapiro,
& Schnitzler, 2003). However, we found that detection of T1 did
not deteriorate (if anything it improved slightly). This is difficult to
explain in terms of a simple redistribution of resources. In another
condition, we also ruled out the hypothesis that the observed
improvements in performance were due to participants being over-
all more motivated in the critical experimental conditions: We
rewarded participants for each correct (and punished them for each
incorrect) T1 and T2 detection according to a scheme that could
potentially double their earnings. It was assumed that this would
make the observers more motivated. Nevertheless, T2 identifica-
tion was no better than in the standard control condition and was
again worse than in the free association and music conditions. This
suggests that overall motivation contributed little.
To explain these findings, we hypothesized that the beneficial
effects of task-irrelevant mental activity on the attentional blink
might occur because observers are in a more diffuse mental state
(Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005). To deal with the multiple require-
ments of the two tasks (e.g., watch, listen, think), participants need
to adopt a more distributed mode of attention. This broader, more
flexible operating mode temporally widens attention and, there-
fore, benefits the processing of targets that are closely separated in
time. However, although perhaps intuitively appealing, this hy-
pothesis is not entirely satisfactory. First, the adoption of a diffuse
mental state implies that, as a whole, fewer attentional resources
are allocated to the RSVP task. Although a more distributed state
of attention may be relatively beneficial to T2, in its current form,
the hypothesis fails to explain why T1 detection does not suffer. A
second and perhaps more fundamental concern is that the concept
of a diffuse mental state is theoretically underspecified and there-
fore open to multiple interpretations.
The Present Study
In the present study, we tested two new hypotheses regarding
the mechanisms by which distracting task circumstances result in
a reduced attentional blink for T2 in combination with no deteri-
oration—or even an improvement—in performance for T1. The
first hypothesis, the overinvestment hypothesis, is rooted in exist-
ing explanations of the attentional blink, but offers a novel per-
spective on them. The second hypothesis, the positive-affect hy-
pothesis, is derived from existing behavioral and neurobiological
work demonstrating the beneficial effects of positive affect on task
performance. Although more explicit, both hypotheses are consis-
tent with our previous and more general suggestion that the effects
of distraction on the attentional blink are mediated through vari-
ations in general mental state.
The Overinvestment Hypothesis
The overinvestment hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 1. Fol-
lowing earlier theories (Chun & Potter, 1995; Jolicoeur &
Dell’Acqua, 1998; Shapiro, Arnell, & Raymond, 1997), we as-
sume that initially all RSVP items receive a considerable amount
of processing, leading to transient representations of these items at
a conceptual level. The amount of processing for a particular item
may be biased by factors such as similarity to the target or
temporal position in the stream (e.g., Isaak, Shapiro, & Martin,
1999; Shapiro & Raymond, 1994). Also following earlier theories,
we assume that these vulnerable representations compete for a
limited-capacity processing stage, to which only one (Chun &
Potter, 1995; Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua, 1998) or at most a few
(Shapiro et al., 1997) items can gain access. Access to this second
stage is necessary for an item to be consolidated for later report,
and here we assume that an item enters this stage when its
activation exceeds an internal activation threshold. However, if
items other than T1 and T2 enter this limited-capacity stage, these
may interfere with the consolidation process through competition
or substitution masking.
The critical claim of the overinvestment hypothesis is that
processing interference in the second stage is a direct consequence
of allocating too many attentional resources to the RSVP stream,
which leads to the entry of too many task-irrelevant items. Con-
versely, a reduction in attentional focus limits the number of items
that can access the second stage, which alleviates the amount of
interference and reduces the probability of an attentional blink.
1 It deserves mentioning that a recent attempt to replicate this result has
failed. T. Spalek and V. Di Lollo (personal communication, May–August
2005) used the same displays and the same musical tune as Olivers and
Nieuwenhuis (2005), but did not ask participants to perform the additional
task of detecting a yell in the tune. (Note though that Olivers & Nieuwen-
huis, 2005, did not find a difference between conditions with and without
a yell-detection task.) We therefore decided to rerun the original experi-
ment (including some design improvements). We again found a significant
improvement in the music condition relative to the standard condition, but
this improvement was substantially smaller than the original effect, and the
attentional blink did not disappear. The data from both labs are available on
request, and we plan to fully report on them elsewhere.
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Figure 1A represents the standard case of an attentional blink
experiment. Perhaps ushered by the experimenter, the participant
is determined to do well and strongly focuses his or her attention
on the RSVP task. Normally, this degree of focused attention is
advantageous, because in the real world, target objects are rela-
tively stationary or at least unlikely to be quickly replaced by an
irrelevant object. However, in the more artificial case of the RSVP
stream, in which items rapidly succeed one another, the high
amount of attention paid to each of the items results in the
selection not only of T1 and T2, but also of several task-irrelevant
items. As noted above, this increases the amount of competition or
the probability of substitution in the second, limited-capacity
stage, thereby reducing T2 accuracy and, to a lesser degree, T1
accuracy.
Compare this with the case when the observer performs an
additional task, as is represented in Figure 1B. Because the addi-
tional task draws away attentional resources from the RSVP
stream, fewer distractors will reach threshold, resulting in reduced
interference in the second stage. Provided that both targets still
reach threshold (on the basis of their match with internal templates
of the targets), detection of T2 will actually benefit from this
reduction in resources and, to a lesser extent, so may T1, because
the system is less likely to spuriously respond to earlier distractors.
Finally, Figure 1C represents the case in which too few resources
are allocated to the RSVP task. When observers are too distracted
or disengaged, none of the items are likely to reach threshold, and
no targets will be detected.
Thus, whereas observers may believe that being fully dedicated
to the task will result in optimal performance, the overinvestment
hypothesis suggests that an intermediate level of attention is actu-
ally more beneficial. Having observers perform an additional task
is one way of reducing the amount of attention to this intermediate
level. Note that existing theories of the attentional blink stress the
fundamental lack of attentional resources caused by the processing
of T1 as the main source of interference in T2 processing. The
overinvestment hypothesis offers a radically different perspective
by proposing that it is, in fact, the overinvestment of attention in
the RSVP stream that results in the limited-capacity stage being
overwhelmed with items and hence results in interference in T2
processing.
The Positive-Affect Hypothesis
As discussed earlier, we observed improved attentional blink
performance when we asked participants to concurrently think
about their holidays or an imaginary dinner or asked them to
concurrently listen (and respond) to music (Olivers & Nieuwen-
huis, 2005). As we suggested above, the overinvestment hypoth-
esis can explain these findings by referring to the resources needed
by the additional task that had to be fulfilled. However, the
improved performance may also have been due to a more positive
affective state as evoked by, for example, the frivolous contents of
the thoughts or the upbeat nature of the tune. Recent studies by
Fenske and Eastwood (2003) and Dreisbach and Goschke (2004)
have shown that positive affect can modulate selective attention.
Using an adaptation of Eriksen and Eriksen’s (1974) flanker task,
Fenske and Eastwood (2003) found compatibility effects of flank-
ing distractors on a central target when the target was a schematic
happy face, but not when it was a schematic sad face, suggesting
that the spatial scope of attention was affected by the emotion
conveyed by the face. In Dreisbach and Goschke’s study, partic-
ipants were required to detect a target of a certain color, while they
had to ignore a distractor presented in what had previously been
the target color. Normally this leads to perseveration costs on the
first few trials, because the old target color is initially difficult to
ignore. However, Dreisbach and Goschke found that perseveration
costs were reduced when the trials were preceded by positively
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the overinvestment hypothesis. The
x-axis represents the items in the rapid serial visual presentation stream.
The y-axis represents the amount of attention invested in the items. In Panel
A, too many resources are invested, resulting in multiple items competing
for consolidation, including several distractors. In Panel B, the diminished
resources lead to the targets, but not the distractors, reaching the consoli-
dation stage. When too few resources are spent, as in Panel C, no items
reach the consolidation stage. D  distractor; T1  Target 1; T2 
Target 2.
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laden pictures relative to neutral and negative pictures. They
concluded that positive affect induces cognitive flexibility, biasing
attentional orienting toward the new color. Indeed, it has been
assumed for a long time that cognitive performance is influenced
by the motivational and emotional states of the organism (Easter-
brook, 1959; Wachtel, 1967; for reviews, see Ashby, Isen, &
Turken, 1999; Derryberry & Tucker, 1994; Isen, 1999). Specifi-
cally, negative stimuli, negative feelings, and feelings of stress
tend to lead to a narrowing of the mind, whereas positive affect is
known to enhance cognitive flexibility in a wide variety of tasks,
including verbal fluency, free association, categorization, problem-
solving, and selective attention tasks. According to Ashby et al.
(1999), such effects of positive affect on cognition are mediated by
increased dopamine levels (see also Beatty, 1995). The dopamine
system has also been implicated in increased performance on
short-term memory tasks (Braver & Cohen, 2000; Fuster, 1997;
Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Gray, 2001). This is directly relevant to
attentional blink theories, which almost invariably assign an im-
portant role to short-term memory processes.
We believe that the concept of cognitive flexibility lies close to
what we have referred to as a diffuse mental state, a state charac-
terized by the exploration rather than exploitation of information-
processing strategies, by scanning and flexible responding rather
than selective and focused attention, and by observers being re-
ceptive to an increased variety of input. Thus, positive affect may
contribute to improved attentional blink performance by rendering
the system less temporally focused, making it more sensitive to
multiple targets, and/or increasing the capacity to store or retrieve
those targets.
In our earlier work (Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005), the effects
of an additional task and positive affect on the attentional blink
were potentially confounded. For example, thinking about one’s
holiday may be regarded as an additional task but may also be
regarded as an activity inducing positive affect. In the present
study, we tested the possible effects of these variables in separate
experiments. We first tested the overinvestment hypothesis in
Experiment 1, in which each RSVP trial was presented during the
retention interval of a short-term memory task. According to the
overinvestment hypothesis, the additional memory task should
have led to a reduced attentional blink compared with when no
such additional task was present. The positive-affect hypothesis
was tested in Experiment 2, in which the RSVP streams were
preceded by briefly presented pictures of positive, negative, or
neutral content. If positive affect reduces the magnitude of the
attentional blink, then we should have seen a performance im-
provement with positive pictures.
We assumed that the additional-task and positive-affect manip-
ulations indirectly induced a more diffuse attentional state, without
the observer necessarily being aware of this. This left open the
question of whether, in the absence of additional task requirements
or other exogenous influences, observers themselves can induce a
more beneficial attentional state. Experiment 3 explored the pos-
sibility of an endogenously generated diffuse attentional state by
directly instructing participants to focus less on the RSVP task.
According to the overinvestment hypothesis, this should have
improved performance.
Finally, although the overinvestment hypothesis and positive-
affect hypothesis have been presented here as reflecting separate
variables (one more cognitive, the other more affective), the two
may be fundamentally related. We discuss this further in the
General Discussion section, but for now we stress that any evi-
dence for one hypothesis should not be seen as evidence against
the other.
Experiment 1: An Additional Task Improves Attentional
Blink Performance
In this and subsequent experiments, participants completed a
standard attentional blink task in which both T1 and T2 were digits
in an RSVP stream consisting of letters, all black on a gray
background (Chun & Potter, 1995; the same task was used by
Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005). In the critical condition of Exper-
iment 1, each attentional blink trial was presented during the
retention interval of a simple short-term memory task. The RSVP
stream was preceded by a pattern consisting of three randomly
drawn line segments, as is illustrated in Figure 2A. In the
additional-task condition, participants were required to remember
the pattern while viewing and responding to the RSVP stream and
to compare the memorized pattern with the pattern presented on
the subsequent trial. They indicated a match by pressing the space
bar. Performance for T1 and T2 in this condition was compared
with performance in a no-additional-task condition, in which the
same random line patterns preceded each RSVP trial, but partici-
pants were not required to remember and respond to them. We
assumed that the requirements of the additional memory task
would draw away attentional resources from the RSVP stream. If
the attentional blink is indeed due to an overinvestment of atten-
tional resources, this additional-task manipulation should have
reduced the attentional blink.
Method
Participants. Twenty-eight students of the Vrije Universiteit Amster-
dam were randomly assigned to either of two conditions. Fourteen (8 male,
2 left-handed, ages 16–22 years, average age  19 years) were assigned to
the additional-task condition. The other 14 (7 male, 1 left-handed, ages
17–22 years, average age  20 years) were assigned to the no-additional-
task condition. All participants were paid 4 euro. They were naive to the
purpose of the experiment, and none of them had participated in any of the
experiments of Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2005).
Stimuli, procedure, and design. Stimulus generation and response re-
cording were done with E-Prime (2003). The stimuli were the same in the
additional-task and no-additional-task conditions. A trial started with a line
pattern presented for 2,000 ms. The pattern consisted of three white (70
cd/m2) line segments on a gray (16 cd/m2) background. The endpoints of
the line segments were randomly chosen from within a circular area
(radius: 1.6° visual angle) around the center of the screen, with the
restriction that each line segment would be at least 1.2° long. After a
1,000-ms blank period, a 0.5° 0.5° fixation cross was presented for 1,000
ms in the center of the display and was subsequently replaced by a rapid
serial presentation of 13 to 21 letters, each measuring approximately 0.8 
0.8°. Each letter was randomly drawn (without replacement) from the
alphabet and presented for 75 ms, followed by a 25-ms blank. I, O, Q, and
S were left out because they resemble digits. On each trial, 2 of the letters
were replaced with digits, randomly drawn (without replacement) from the
digits 2 through 9. The second digit (T2) was presented 3 to 6 temporal
positions from the end of the stream. The temporal distance between the
first digit (T1) and the second (T2) was systematically varied from 1 to 5
items, corresponding to lags of 100, 200, 300, 400, and 500 ms (Lags 1–5,
respectively). The entire RSVP series was presented in black on a gray (40
cd/m2) background. After 1,000 ms, a new trial started.
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Participants’ primary task was to identify both T1 and T2. An unspeeded
response was made at the end of each trial by typing the digits in order on
a standard keyboard. In the additional-task condition, participants were
instructed to remember the random line patterns presented before the
RSVP stream. Whenever the pattern was the same as that on the previous
trial (25% of trials), the space bar was to be pressed within 2,000 ms. When
it was different (75% of trials), no response was required. Misses and false
alarms were followed by feedback stating that the pattern was either the
same or different, respectively. Consecutive patterns, if different, differed
only in one of the three line segments. In the no-additional-task condition,
the same patterns were presented, but the participants were simply asked to
watch them. The experiment started with 10 practice trials, followed by
two blocks of 100 trials each, resulting in a total of 40 trials per lag, which
were randomly mixed. The experiment lasted approximately 25 min.
During the practice stage, digit identification errors were followed by
negative feedback in red stating, No, it was #, with # being the correct digit.
During the main experiment, no feedback was provided on the RSVP task.
Participants were instructed to guess whenever they could not identify a
digit. In all conditions, all instructions were automated and presented on
screen. Apart from initial set up and final payments, participants did not
interact with the experimenter, who was a lab assistant naive to the main
purpose of the experiments.
Results
In the additional-task condition, the average overall accuracy
was 89% on the memory task. Accuracy data were submitted to an
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with pattern type (same, different)
and lag (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) as variables. Overall, accuracy was
higher on different-pattern trials (92%) than on same-pattern trials
(83%), F(1, 13)  9.64, MSE  0.030, p  .01. There was no
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the procedures of (A) Experiment 1, (B) Experiment 2A, and (C) Experiment
2B. T1  Target 1; T2  Target 2. The photos printed here are for example only; to maintain the research value
of the images in the International Affective Picture System (IAPS), we have not included actual IAPS photos.
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main effect of or interaction with lag (Fs  1.2, ns). Pattern type
and memory accuracy had no significant effects on RSVP task
performance; therefore, we collapsed the data across these
variables.
To assess performance on the RSVP task, average T1 and T2
identification accuracy data were submitted to an ANOVA with
condition (additional task, no additional task) and lag as variables.
Trials on which T1 and T2 were accurately identified but in the
wrong order were treated as correct. Figure 3A shows the results
for T1. Accuracy increased slightly but significantly with lag, F(4,
104)  8.00, MSE  0.003, p  .001. There was a weak trend
toward overall better performance in the additional-task condition,
F(1, 26)  2.27, MSE  0.094, p  .15 (this was significant for
Lags 3–5, p  .001). There was no Condition  Lag interaction
(F  1, ns).
Figure 3B shows the results for T2 when T1 was identified
correctly. However, the same pattern of results held when T2
performance was analyzed independent of T1 accuracy. There was
a main effect of lag, F(4, 104)  13.74, MSE  0.008, p  .001.
Accuracy dropped after the first lag and then gradually increased
again. There was a trend toward overall better performance in the
additional-task condition, F(1, 26) 2.59, MSE 0.058, p .12.
More important is the significant Lag  Condition interaction,
F(4, 104)  2.63, MSE  0.008, p  .05. The drop in accuracy
after the first lag was shallower in the additional-task condition
than in the no-additional-task condition.
Discussion
Overall, the results show the classic attentional blink pattern:
Processing of the second of two targets in an RSVP stream was
impaired when it closely followed the first target (cf. Chun &
Potter, 1995; Raymond et al., 1992). Further corroborating previ-
ous studies, the attentional blink was reduced for Lag 1, a phe-
nomenon that has been referred to as Lag 1 sparing (Potter, Chun,
Banks, & Muckenhoupt, 1998). The important new result is that
the attentional blink was substantially reduced (here by an average
of about 9% for Lags 2–5) by giving participants the additional
task of having to remember a random line pattern. This result is
difficult to explain under a simple limited-capacity account, ac-
cording to which T2 suffers because T1 uses up the available
resources. If so, then the reduction of resources available for the
RSVP task should have led to a more profound rather than an
ameliorated blink. We also note that the additional task did not
lead to a mere shifting of resources from T1 to T2. If anything,
performance for T1 also improved, though not significantly, in the
additional-task condition.
The results provide direct support for the overinvestment hy-
pothesis. To fulfill the additional task requirements, observers
needed to shift resources away from the RSVP task. As a result,
fewer distractors in the stream could gain access to the limited-
capacity stage and interfere with the targets for control over
responding. The improvement in performance is especially re-
markable given that the additional task involved remembering a
visual pattern across trials. As we noted earlier, limitations in
short-term memory are thought to play an important role in the
attentional blink. Assuming that the additional task put an in-
creased load on short-term memory, one might expect T2 perfor-
mance to be worse rather than better, compared with the no-
additional-task condition. Nevertheless, short-term memory
accounts could accommodate the current findings by referring to
the different types of stimulus materials used by the two tasks; it
is not implausible that random line patterns and alphanumeric
characters are processed and stored in short-term memory systems
that do not interfere with each other (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974;
Jonides et al., 1996; Logie, 1995; E. E. Smith et al., 1995; Tresch,
Sinnamon, & Seamon, 1993).
Experiment 2: Positive Affect Reduces the Attentional
Blink
In Experiment 2A, we investigated the effects of positive affect
on the attentional blink. We used the same RSVP task as in
Experiment 1, except that, instead of random line patterns, the
trials were now preceded by briefly presented photographs from
the International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang, Bradley,
& Cuthbert, 2005, see Figure 2B for an illustration of the exper-
imental procedure). There was no additional task involved. The
neutral-affect condition contained pictures of everyday objects,
such as a towel, a basket, and a cup. It served as a baseline for the
Figure 3. Average identification accuracy (% correct) for (A) the first
target (T1) and (B) the second target (T2) in the RSVP task of Experiment
1 as a function of Lags 1–5 (100–500 ms) between the targets and the
presence of an additional task involving the remembering of a random line
pattern. Error bars denote one standard error of the mean.
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positive-affect condition, which contained pictures of a more
pleasant content, such as babies, puppies, and smiling children.
This condition was designed to induce at least a temporary positive
affective state in the observers, but it may also have increased their
arousal levels relative to the neutral conditions. To control for the
latter possibility, the negative-affect condition contained pictures
of a more negative content, such as a snake, a crying child, and a
skin-puncturing syringe. The negative pictures were matched to
the positive pictures with respect to arousal value, according to the
IAPS ratings. The same pictures were used in a visual attention
task by Dreisbach and Goschke (2004; see The Positive-Affect
Hypothesis section of this article). According to the positive-affect
hypothesis, we should observe a reduced attentional blink in the
positive-affect condition relative to the neutral condition. If, how-
ever, the improved performance is due to increased arousal levels,
then we should also see an improvement in the negative-affect
condition.
The positive, negative, and neutral pictures we used in Experi-
ment 2A may have differed not only in affective content, but also
in terms of lower level visual properties. For example, the positive
pictures were lighter overall (average 10.2 cd/m2) than the neutral
and negative pictures (average 1.2 and 2.6 cd/m2, respectively).
This is perhaps not surprising given the gloomy content of the last
category, but it may have led to differential effects of luminance
adaptation on the attentional blink (Giesbrecht, Bischof, & King-
stone, 2004). Similarly, overall variations in color could also have
contributed to performance differences (Plack & Shick, 1974;
Smets, 1969). Experiment 2B was conducted to rule out the
possibility that the effects observed in Experiment 2A were due to
such low-level differences. It replicated the positive- and negative-
affect conditions of Experiment 2A (i.e., the conditions that dif-
fered the most in performance), but presented scrambled versions
of the pictures. The scrambling resulted in the pictures becoming
unrecognizable, while low-level visual aspects, such as overall
luminance and color, were preserved (see Figure 2C for an exam-
ple). If the improved performance in the positive-affect condition
of Experiment 2A was due to these low-level differences, then we
should see an improvement for the scrambled positive pictures too.
In contrast, if performance in Experiment 2A improved because of
the differences in content, then there should be no difference in
performance between the positive and negative scrambled pictures.
Method
Participants. In Experiment 2A, 42 students of the Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. Fourteen (9
male, 3 left-handed, ages 16–31 years, average age  21 years) were
assigned to the neutral-affect condition. Another 14 (7 male, 2 left-handed,
ages 19–25 years, average age  21 years) were assigned to the positive-
affect condition. The final 14 (8 male, 2 left-handed, ages 18–35 years,
average age 23 years) were assigned to the negative-affect condition. All
participants were paid 4 euro. None of the participants had participated in
Experiment 1 or in Olivers and Nieuwenhuis’s (2005) study. In Experiment
2B, 26 new participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions.
Thirteen (4 male, 1 left-handed, ages 19–35 years, average age  26.5
years) were assigned to the negative scrambled condition. Another 13 (2
male, 2 left-handed, ages 18–37 years, average age  27.1 years) were
assigned to the positive scrambled condition. None of the participants had
participated in Experiment 1 or 2A or in Olivers and Nieuwenhuis’s (2005)
study.
Stimuli, procedure, and design. The experimental setup was largely the
same as in Experiment 1, with the following changes: There were no
random line patterns and there was no additional task. Instead, each RSVP
stream was preceded by a picture from the IAPS database (Lang et al.,
2005), which was presented displaywide for 250 ms, followed by a 100-ms
blank display and a 150-ms fixation cross. In Experiment 2A, participants
saw 10 neutral pictures, 10 positive pictures, and 10 negative pictures.
According to IAPS norms, the mean pleasantness ratings (SE) for these
sets are 4.90 (0.95), 7.68 (1.52), and 2.89 (1.66), respectively. According
to the same norms, the arousal ratings (SE) are 2.56 (1.85), 4.71 (2.38),
and 5.25 (2.23), respectively. Participants were instructed to simply look at
the pictures. It was made clear that they would not be asked to remember
them later. To control for possible mood differences prior to the experi-
ment, participants rated their mood on three 7-point rating scales (excited–
relaxed, awake–tired, happy–sad). Furthermore, at the end of the experi-
ment, they were asked how interesting (or boring) they found the
experiments, how interesting (or boring) they found the pictures,2 how
positive or sad they felt after the experiment, and how positive or sad they
found the pictures (all on 7-point rating scales). Finally, they were shown
all 10 pictures and asked to choose the three that “induced the strongest
feelings” to see if some pictures might induce a stronger blink than others.
This was not clearly the case, and we do not report on this further. The
experiment ended with a debriefing about the aim of the experiment and
the opportunity to talk about the pictures in case participants found them
too upsetting, especially in the negative condition. None did.
Experiment 2B was identical to Experiment 2A except for the following
changes: We dropped the neutral condition and instead directly compared
the conditions containing positive and negative pictures. However, these
pictures were now scrambled. The scrambling process divided each picture
into small 0.7°  0.7° squares, which were then randomly rearranged,
making sure that no square was lost. This way the pictures became
unrecognizable, but preserved their overall luminance and color.
Results
Experiment 2A. Average T1 and T2 accuracy data were sub-
mitted to an ANOVA with affect condition (neutral, positive,
negative) and lag (1–5) as variables. Trials on which T1 and T2
were accurately identified but in the wrong order were treated as
correct. Figure 4A shows the results for T1. There was a trend
toward overall better performance in the positive-affect condition,
relative to the neutral and negative conditions, F(2, 39)  2.47,
MSE 0.045, p .10. The effect was significant when comparing
only the positive and negative conditions, F(1, 26) 5.75, MSE
0.038, p  .05. There were no effects involving lag (all Fs  1,
ns).
Figure 4B shows the results for T2 contingent on correct T1
identification, but the same pattern of results also held when T2
was analyzed regardless of T1 accuracy. There was a main effect
of lag, F(4, 156)  42.96, MSE  0.011, p  .001. Accuracy
dropped after Lag 1 and then gradually increased again. There was
also an effect of affect type. Performance was better overall in the
positive-affect condition than in the neutral and negative-affect
conditions, F(2, 39)  4.00, MSE  0.084, p  .05. Furthermore,
the Lag  Affect Condition interaction was significant, F(8,
156)  2.23, MSE  0.011, p  .05. The drop in accuracy after
2 Note that there is no straightforward Dutch translation for arousal
without also invoking a sexual connotation. Therefore, rather than asking
participants how aroused they were, we asked them how excited/relaxed
they were beforehand and afterward asked them how bored they were by
the experiment and pictures.
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Lag 1 was shallower in the positive-affect condition than in the
neutral and negative-affect conditions. Separate pairwise compar-
isons revealed that performance in the positive-affect condition
was better than in the neutral condition. There was a main effect of
affect condition, F(1, 26)  4.90, MSE  0.067, p  .05, and a
significant Lag  Affect Condition interaction, F(4, 104)  3.20,
MSE  0.009, p  .02. The positive-affect condition was also
better than the negative-affect condition: affect condition, F(1,
26)  7.64, MSE  0.082, p  .01; Lag  Affect Condition
interaction, F(4, 104)  3.18, MSE  0.010, p  .02. In contrast,
the neutral and negative-affect conditions did not differ signifi-
cantly (all Fs 1, ns). We also performed a correlation analysis in
which we related the average T2 performance on Lags 2, 3, and 4
(i.e., the lags on which the strongest attentional blink effects
occurred) to the emotional valence and arousal ratings of the
individual pictures (as provided by the IAPS database; Lang et al.,
2005) within each affect condition. The only correlation that
reached significance was a trend for worse performance in the
positive-affect condition for pictures rated as more arousing (r 
.68, p  .05).
To control for possible a priori mood differences between the
three groups, we asked participants to rate how excited, positive,
and awake they were beforehand. Table 1 shows the average
ratings. None of the differences could consistently explain the
results, except that the positive-affect group felt overall slightly
more excited beforehand. Although this was not significant ( p 
.190), we decided to run a control analysis in which we compared
the most excited group of participants (excitement ratings 1–4,
N 11) with the least excited group (excitement ratings 6–7, N
15) on T2 performance. The analysis revealed no differences
between these groups (all Fs  0.1, ns). In fact, across the entire
sample of participants (N  42), there was no correlation between
the a priori level of excitement and performance (r  .08, ns).
Together, this makes the level of arousal beforehand an unlikely
candidate for explaining the results.
Table 1 also shows the ratings of various aspects after the
experiment. Somewhat surprising is that the experiment was con-
sidered least boring in the neutral condition (although this finding
was not significant), especially given that the pictures were rated
most boring in this condition (approaching significance). In fact,
across conditions, how boring the participants rated the overall
experiment and their attentional blink performance were signifi-
cantly correlated, to the extent that the more boring they found the
experiment, the better they performed (r  .36, p  .05). Note
further that the negative pictures were at least as exciting as (or
less boring than) the positive pictures. This is important because it
confirms our assumption that the negative and positive pictures
were equally arousing relative to the neutral pictures. Finally, a
strong difference in ratings—and the only one that corresponds
directly with the differences in attentional blink performance—
Table 1
Average Mood and Arousal Ratings Before and After
Experiment 2A for the Neutral, Positive-Affect, and Negative-
Affect Conditions
Question and anchors for
rating scales
Affect condition
paNeutral Positive Negative
Before the experiment
How excited do you feel?
(excited–relaxed) 5.2 4.4 5.1 .190
How tired do you feel?
(awake–tired) 4.1 3.9 3.5 .535
How positive do you feel?
(happy–sad) 3.4 3.0 2.6 .323
After the experiment
How boring was the
experiment? (not
boring–boring) 3.6 4.7 4.5 .209
How boring were the
pictures? (not boring–
boring) 5.2 4.0 3.8 .057
How positive do you feel?
(happy–sad) 4.0 3.7 3.1 .140
How positive were the
pictures? (happy–sad) 4.6 3.1 5.1 .001
Note. Ratings were given on a scale from 1 to 7.
a This column shows p values for an analysis of variance testing the
differences among affect conditions.
Figure 4. Average identification accuracy (% correct) for (A) the first
target (T1) and (B) the second target (T2) in the RSVP task of Experiment
2A as a function of Lags 1–5 (100–500 ms) between the targets and the
affective content of the preceding pictures (positive, neutral, and negative).
Error bars denote one standard error of the mean.
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was found for the emotional content of the pictures. The positive
pictures were rated more positively than the neutral and negative
pictures.
Experiment 2B. Average T1 and T2 accuracy data were sub-
mitted to an ANOVA with affect type (positive scrambled, nega-
tive scrambled) and lag (1–5) as variables. Trials on which T1 and
T2 were accurately identified but in the wrong order were treated
as correct. Figure 5A shows the results for T1. There was a main
effect of lag, F(4, 96) 5.96, MSE 0.004, p .001. There were
no effects involving affect type (all Fs  1, ns). Figure 5B shows
the results for T2 contingent on T1 accuracy, but the same pattern
of results held when T2 was analyzed independent of T1 accuracy.
There was a main effect of lag, F(4, 96)  24.12, MSE  0.011,
p  .001. Accuracy dropped after the first lag and then gradually
increased again. There were no effects involving affect type (all
Fs  1, ns).
As in Experiment 2A, we asked participants to rate how excited,
positive, and awake they felt beforehand. Table 2 shows the
average ratings. There were no significant differences, although
there was a slight trend toward the positive scrambled group
feeling somewhat happier beforehand. Table 2 also shows the
ratings collected after the experiment. Of most importance is that,
in contrast to Experiment 2A, the scrambled positive and negative
pictures were now rated equally with regard to affective content.
This confirmed that our scrambling manipulation was successful at
obscuring differences in affective value between the groups of
pictures.
Discussion
Taken together, the results of Experiments 2A and 2B provide
clear evidence for the positive-affect hypothesis. Briefly present-
ing positive affective pictures before the RSVP stream improved
T2 identification by about 12% relative to neutral pictures and by
about 16% relative to negative pictures (averaged across Lags
2–5). Again, this improvement was not at the expense of T1. There
was also a trend toward an improvement for T1 identification with
more positively laden pictures. Experiment 2B demonstrated that
the improvement was also not due to low-level visual differences
between the groups of pictures. Furthermore, the results cannot be
explained by the fact that the positive pictures were more arousing
than the neutral pictures. The negative pictures were as arousing as
the positive pictures according to the IAPS ratings and according
to our participants’ own boringness ratings. Yet, the negative
pictures, if anything, led to slightly worse T1 and T2 detection
accuracy relative to the neutral pictures and certainly led to worse
detection accuracy relative to the positive pictures. Also, within
the positive condition, there was a tendency for worse performance
with more arousing pictures, as indicated by a negative correlation
between arousal values and T2 performance.
Figure 5. Average identification accuracy (% correct) for (A) the first
target (T1) and (B) the second target (T2) in the rapid serial visual
presentation (RSVP) task of Experiment 2B as a function of Lags 1–5
(100–500 ms) between the targets and the type of picture preceding the
RSVP stream (positive or negative scrambled pictures). Error bars denote
one standard error of the mean.
Table 2
Average Mood and Arousal Ratings Before and After
Experiment 2B for the Positive Scrambled and Negative
Scrambled Conditions
Question and anchors for rating
scales
Affect condition
pa
Positive
scrambled
Negative
scrambled
Before the experiment
How excited do you feel?
(excited–relaxed) 4.6 5.3 .365
How tired do you feel?
(awake–tired) 4.9 3.9 .270
How positive do you feel?
(happy–sad) 2.7 3.4 .101
After the experiment
How boring was the
experiment? (not boring–
boring) 3.7 3.0 .336
How boring were the pictures?
(not boring–boring) 4.7 4.0 .499
How positive do you feel?
(happy–sad) 3.8 3.2 .372
How positive were the
pictures? (happy–sad) 3.5 3.5 .868
Note. Ratings were given on a scale from 1 to 7.
a This column shows p values for a t test of the differences between affect
conditions.
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Furthermore, across conditions, the participants who found the
experiment boring tended to perform better. Taken together, this
might suggest that performance is especially aided under posi-
tively affective and slightly underarousing conditions.
Our findings corroborate those of Dreisbach and Goschke
(2004) and Fenske and Eastwood (2003), who found a greater
influence of distracting information under positive-affect condi-
tions. In their studies, this influence occurred across different
feature dimensions or different spatial locations. The present re-
sults suggest that positive affect also influences selection across
time, allowing for improved target detection in RSVP tasks.
An alternative, but related, explanation of the findings may lie in
the fact that negative stimuli appear to capture attention more than
positive stimuli (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2001, 2003).3 This
would mean that attention is summoned better on negative trials,
which, according to the overinvestment hypothesis, is detrimental
to performance. This way, the affective value of the pictures does
not affect performance directly, but through recruiting more or less
attention to the task. In the General Discussion section, we return
to the possible link between the positive-affect hypothesis and the
overinvestment hypothesis.
Note further that we do not wish to suggest that the differences
in performance in Experiment 2A were due to long-term mood
changes caused by the affect-laden pictures. Indeed, the little
difference between the different conditions with regard to partic-
ipants’ self-assessed mood ratings before and after the experiment
suggests that no such long-term mood changes occurred. However,
several studies have shown that IAPS pictures induce at least
temporary changes in emotion-related brain activation (measured
as differences between blocks of trials or even on a trial-by-trial
basis; Hariri, Tessitore, Mattay, Fera, & Weinberger, 2002; Lang,
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998; Liberzon et al., 2000; Northoff et al.,
2002; J. C. Smith, Bradley, & Lang, 2005). Our results suggest that
the pictures also induced such short-lived emotional changes in
Experiment 2A. Of course, this is not to say that the attentional
blink may not be affected by long-term mood changes. On the
contrary, a study by Rokke, Arnell, Koch, and Andrews (2002) has
shown that moderately to severely dysphoric students suffered
from a longer and more profound attentional blink than mildly
dysphoric and nondysphoric students. This fits with the idea that a
more positive state of mind may benefit performance in the atten-
tional blink task.
Experiment 3: Instruction to Concentrate Less Reduces
the Attentional Blink
So far we have tried to induce a more distributed attentional
state by imposing on the observer additional task requirements (the
current Experiment 1 and the free association and music conditions
of Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005) or different stimuli (the current
Experiment 2 and the music condition of Olivers & Nieuwenhuis,
2005). In this sense, the more diffuse mental state was forced by
external circumstances, possibly without the participant’s aware-
ness. In Experiment 3, we investigated whether observers could
actively adopt the more beneficial attentional state themselves if
we simply instructed them to do so. For this purpose, we compared
two groups of participants. At the start of the first half of the
experiment, both groups received exactly the same instruction,
namely to concentrate maximally on the RSVP stream. After this
first block, for one of the groups (the standard group), the instruc-
tion to concentrate was then simply repeated. For the other group
(the unfocused group), the instruction changed: They were now
asked to try and concentrate a little less and adopt a more diffuse
state of attention. On the basis of the overinvestment hypothesis,
we predicted that for this group, performance in the second half of
the experiment would improve relatively more than for the stan-
dard group.
Furthermore, Experiment 3 served to exclude another explana-
tion of the data so far. Up to now, the crucial manipulations have
been between groups of participants. There may therefore have
been a risk that the effects were due to a priori differences between
groups (despite random allocation of participants). Because in
Experiment 3 both groups initially received exactly the same
instruction, the first half of the experiment allowed for a baseline
comparison of the two groups.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four students of the Vrije Universiteit Amster-
dam were randomly assigned to either of two conditions. Twelve (6 male,
12 right-handed, ages 18–21 years, average age 21 years) were assigned
to the standard instruction condition. The other 12 (5 male, 1 left-handed,
ages 18–35 years, average age 21 years) were assigned to the unfocused
condition. All participants were paid 4 euro. They were naive as to the
purpose of the experiment, and none of them had participated in the
previous experiments.
Stimuli, procedure, and design. The stimuli and experimental proce-
dure were the same as in the previous two experiments, except for the
following changes. Only the RSVP stimuli and task were included (no
additional tasks or stimuli). All participants first received a standard
explanation of the task, which they then practiced for 15 trials. Then, at the
start of the real experiment, all participants received the same instruction,
namely to “try to concentrate as much as possible and correctly identify as
many digits as possible” (translated from Dutch). All participants then
performed the first block of 100 trials (20 for each lag). Then, in the
standard-instruction condition, the instruction was essentially repeated: “In
the next block you will receive exactly the same task. Try again to
maximally concentrate. It turns out that the task often becomes easier the
second time around.” In the unfocused condition, however, the instruction
changed:
In the next block you will receive exactly the same task. However, we
would like to ask you to concentrate a little less. In other words, keep
on looking at the stream, but try to pay a little less attention to the
digits. Try to adopt a slightly more “diffuse,” “absent-minded,” “pas-
sive” attitude, and let the digits “come at you” in a way. This may
appear strange, but it turns out that the task often becomes easier.
Both groups then completed the second block of 100 trials. We decided to
end both instructions by mentioning that “the task often becomes easier”
(even if this may not have been the case for the standard group), to prevent
any effects due to positive expectations. All instructions were presented on
the screen, and the experiment was run by a lab assistant naive as to which
participant received which condition.
Results
Trials on which T1 and T2 were accurately identified but in the
wrong order were treated as correct. Figures 6A and 6C show the
3 We thank a reviewer for raising this possibility.
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results for T1 for the two blocks, separated for the standard
instruction group and the unfocused group. Block 1 was run before
the crucial instruction, and performance in this block served as a
baseline; Block 2 was run after the crucial instruction. Accuracy
data were entered in an ANOVA with block and lag as within-
subject variables and with instruction type as a between-subjects
variable. The only significant effect was a Block  Lag interac-
tion, F(4, 88) 3.44, MSE 0.003, p .02. In Block 1, accuracy
appeared to increase slightly with lag, whereas in Block 2, accu-
racy, if anything, dropped slightly with lag.
Figures 6B and 6D show the results for T2 when T1 was
identified correctly for the two blocks and the results separated for
the standard and unfocused groups. There was a main effect of lag,
F(4, 88)  12.51, MSE  0.036, p  .001, because accuracy
dropped after the first lag and then gradually increased again.
Moreover, there was a significant Instruction Type  Block inter-
action, F(1, 22)  6.32, MSE  0.011, p  .02. Performance in
Block 2 (i.e., after the crucial instruction), when compared with
that in Block 1 (before the crucial instruction), improved more for
the unfocused group than for the standard instruction group. Sep-
arate comparisons within the two groups revealed a significant
improvement in Block 2 in the unfocused group, F(1, 11)  9.43,
MSE  0.009, p  .02, but not in the standard group (F  1, ns).
In the unfocused group, 10 out of 12 participants showed an
improvement; in the standard group, only 5 out of 12 showed
improvement. It should be noted, however, that these effects were
weaker when T2 performance was analyzed independent of T1
accuracy, although there was still a trend toward an Instruction
Type Block interaction, F(1, 22) 2.78, MSE 0.014, p .11.
Discussion
The results indicate that observers can, on the basis of instruc-
tions, actively adopt the more distributed attentional state that
appears so beneficial to RSVP performance. The group that, half-
way through the experiment, received the instruction to change
strategy and try to concentrate a little less improved their overall
accuracy, whereas the group that was reminded to keep on con-
centrating did not. Moreover, the roughly equal performance in the
first block (if anything the unfocused group was a little worse)
showed that a priori differences between groups cannot account for
this effect.
Unlike in the previous experiments, there was no tendency for
T1 performance to improve too in the distributed attention condi-
tion. If anything, T1 performance in the second block appeared to
suffer a little for the unfocused group. Although this was not
significant ( p  .27), one may argue that under the present
instruction manipulations, the improvement on T2 occurred at the
expense of T1. However, the fact that the improvements were
stronger when T2 performance was analyzed contingent on T1
correct trials (as compared with all T1 trials) goes against this
argument: If T2 detection improves at the expense of T1 detection,
Figure 6. Average identification accuracy (% correct) for (Panels A and C) the first target (T1), and (Panels
B and D) the second target (T2) of two targets in the rapid serial visual presentation task of Experiment 3, as
a function of Lags 1–5 (100–500 ms) between the targets and the specific block of trials (either before or after
the crucial instruction). Panels A and B show performance for the standard instruction group, and Panels C and
D show performance for the unfocused group. Error bars denote one standard error of the mean. Note that these
error bars reflect between-subjects variability and therefore do not reveal much about the differences between
blocks in this graph. They serve to compare the unfocused group with the standard group.
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then one would expect stronger improvements when T1 was not
detected. Future research will have to further examine the effects
of attention manipulations on the relationship between T1 and T2.
General Discussion
In a previous study (Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005), we found
that task-irrelevant mental activity had a beneficial effect on per-
formance in the attentional blink task. The present article sought to
investigate the mechanisms responsible for these counterintuitive
results. In the current experiments, we found that detection accu-
racy of T2, and to a lesser extent also T1, improved when partic-
ipants concurrently performed an additional task or viewed pic-
tures of positive content. These results replicate the pattern of
results found in our previous study and provide initial evidence for
two specific hypotheses: the overinvestment hypothesis and the
positive-affect hypothesis.
According to the former hypothesis, the probability of an atten-
tional blink is substantially increased by an overinvestment of
attentional resources in the RSVP stream. This causes task-
irrelevant RSVP items to spuriously gain entry to a limited-
capacity processing stage, where they interfere with processing of
the targets, thus threatening the consolidation of these targets for
subsequent report. The overinvestment hypothesis predicts that
drawing away attentional resources from the RSVP stream should
lead to improvements in attentional blink performance. This pre-
diction was tested in Experiment 1 by having participants perform
a short-term memory task concurrently with the attentional blink
task. We found that under these circumstances, the attentional
blink was less profound than in a control condition without an
additional memory task. The hypothesis was further confirmed in
Experiment 3, where we found that explicit instructions to con-
centrate less on the task led to stronger improvements than instruc-
tions to concentrate.
According to our second hypothesis, a reduced attentional blink
may be the result of increased cognitive flexibility as induced by
positive affect. Previous research has shown that, when presented
with stimuli of positive affective valence, observers are less fo-
cused on a single source of information and more flexibly orient to
multiple and/or novel stimuli (Ashby et al., 1999; Dreisbach &
Goschke, 2004; Derryberry & Tucker, 1994; Fenske & Eastwood,
2003). In addition to widening the window of attention, positive
affect has also been associated with increases in short-term mem-
ory capacity. Both variables may be beneficial to target detection
in an RSVP stream. The positive-affect hypothesis was tested and
confirmed in Experiment 2: When RSVP streams were preceded
by briefly presented positively laden pictures, the attentional blink
was less profound than when they were preceded by neutral
pictures. This effect was not due to increased arousal, because
equally arousing negative pictures did not result in any improve-
ments. The effect was also not due to low-level perceptual differ-
ences between the pictures. Taken together, the results indicate
that both cognitive (in terms of an additional task and instructions)
and affective (in terms of positive valence) variables may contrib-
ute to an ameliorated attentional blink.
Relation to Existing Theories
The present as well as our earlier results (Olivers & Nieuwen-
huis, 2005) are difficult to explain in terms of traditional thinking
about the attentional blink. All prevalent theories of the attentional
blink rely on the assumption that T2 suffers because T1 occupies
valuable resources. Under certain circumstances, improvements
may be expected for T2, but only at the expense of T1. In this
sense, we could regard T1 and T2 as two communicating vessels;
the more resources required for the one, the fewer are left for the
other. Indeed, various studies have confirmed a negative correla-
tion between behavioral indices or neural correlates of T1 and T2
processing (Chun & Potter, 1995, Table 1; Hommel et al., 2003;
Seiffert & Di Lollo, 1997; Shore et al., 2001; see also Kahneman,
1973, p. 151). However, note that in most of our experiments, if
anything, T1 detection improved when observers were associating
freely (Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005), listening to music (Olivers
& Nieuwenhuis, 2005), doing another task (Experiment 1), or
being presented with positive stimuli (Experiment 2). Most of
these improvements were relatively small and only approached
significance, and in one experiment (the current Experiment 3),
there was even a small decrement. However, in a meta-analysis
across the experiments of Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2005) and
those presented here, we pooled all experimental conditions (in-
volving free association, music, additional tasks, positive affect,
and instruction to be unfocused) and compared them with the
control conditions (i.e., the standard instruction and neutral-affect
conditions involving no additional tasks). The analysis revealed a
small (3.4%) but significant improvement for the experimental
conditions, F(1, 144)  4.01, MSE  0.053, p  .05 (no interac-
tion with lag, F  1, ns). Taken together the picture is clear: T1
detection does not suffer and may even benefit from the more diffuse
state induced by irrelevant mental activity and positive affect.
However, our results are easy to reconcile with existing theories
if these theories let go of the notion that the attentional blink
reflects a fundamental limitation of the cognitive system. This is
not to say that information processing in the attentional blink task
is not limited in capacity; ultimately, a selection of incoming
information has to be made to enable coherent action (e.g., Allport,
1987). However, the current results suggest that the limited-
capacity processing stage may be overwhelmed by an influx of
rapidly succeeding items if too much rather than too little attention
is paid to the RSVP stream. Reducing the amount of resources
devoted to the RSVP stream will reduce the likelihood of distrac-
tors reaching the limited-capacity stage. This is especially benefi-
cial to processing of T2, but to a lesser extent is also beneficial to
the processing of T1, which too may suffer from interference from
spuriously selected distractors. Note that the overinvestment hy-
pothesis is also consistent with findings that it is substitution
masking that is particularly effective in eliciting an attentional
blink (e.g., Giesbrecht & Di Lollo, 1998), that observers often
make substitution errors in their reports (e.g., Isaak et al., 1999),
and that the attentional blink appears time locked to the first
post-T1 distractor rather than to T1 itself (Di Lollo, Kawahara,
Ghorashi, & Enns, 2005; Olivers, van der Stigchel, & Hulleman, in
press): Overinvestment in the RSVP stream promotes the selection
of the T1 and T2 masks.
Relation Between the Overinvestment Hypothesis and the
Positive-Affect Hypothesis
So far we have presented the overinvestment hypothesis and the
positive-affect hypothesis as describing independent cognitive and
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affective mechanisms. However, it is feasible that positive affect
has an influence on the balance between focused and divided
attention similar to that of adding another task or providing other
sources of distraction. As we have discussed, positive affect is
assumed to increase cognitive flexibility, which is characterized by
an increased receptivity to a variety of input (Ashby, Isen, &
Turken, 1999). It is not hard to conceive of this explorative state as
involving the taking away of resources from any specific task or
stimulus and assigning them more evenly across the environment.
This way, the positive-affect hypothesis may invoke the same
mechanisms as proposed by the overinvestment hypothesis: In-
stead of an additional task, it is the positive affective state that
pulls away resources from the central RSVP task, resulting in
reduced interference. Tentatively then, we propose that the atten-
tional blink is reduced through a more diffuse mental state char-
acterized by a more even distribution of attentional resources. This
diffuse state may be reached in multiple ways, including the
concurrent performance of an additional task and positive affect.
As mentioned earlier, the effect of positive affect on cognition
may be mediated in part by the dopamine system, a system that has
been associated with both affective and cognitive functioning
(Ashby et al., 1999; Beatty, 1995; Braver & Cohen, 2000; Fuster,
1997; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Gray, 2001). In this respect, it is
interesting that the dopamine system projects more strongly to the
left than to the right hemisphere (see Tucker & Williamson, 1984,
for a review). This seems consistent with the finding that positive
affect more strongly benefits performance on typical left hemi-
sphere tasks, whereas negative affect appears to improve perfor-
mance on right hemisphere tasks (Davidson, 1995; Gray, 2001;
Heller & Nitschke, 1997; Heller, Nitschke, & Miller, 1998; Sutton
& Davidson, 1997). Furthermore, the left hemisphere has been
associated with the temporal orienting, sequencing, and switching
of attention, whereas the right hemisphere appears to be more
involved in spatial and sustained aspects of attention (e.g., Banich,
1997; Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Coull & Nobre, 1998; Pardo, Fox,
& Raichle, 1991). This raises the possibility that performance in
attentional blink tasks is determined by the balance between at-
tentional processing in the two hemispheres: (a) a right-lateralized
attention system that serves to induce a focused state in the
observer, concentrating attention on a limited amount of informa-
tion (something that, according to the overinvestment hypothesis,
is detrimental in RSVP tasks), and (b) a left-lateralized system for
the effective distribution of attention in time, which benefits per-
formance in RSVP tasks and is promoted by increased positive
affect.
Some support for this conjecture may be found in a recent case
study by Giesbrecht and Kingstone (2004) involving an individual
with a split brain. This person showed a strong attentional blink
when T2 was presented to the right hemisphere, but no blink when
T2 was presented to the left hemisphere. Similarly, Hillstrom,
Husain, Shapiro, and Rorden (2004) reported the case of a person
with severe and relatively widespread right-side cortical damage.
This individual showed an attentional blink for targets presented to
the right hemisphere but, in contrast with control participants,
showed no blink for targets presented to the left hemisphere. The
same group also found that more specific damage to the temporo–
parietal junction, whether left or right, led to a more profound
blink, whereas damage to the superior parietal lobule did not
(Shapiro, Hillstrom, & Husain, 2002). Cooper, Humphreys, Hul-
leman, and Praamstra (2004) reported that the attentional blink was
reduced when transcranial magnetic stimulation was applied to the
right posterior parietal cortex of healthy participants. Together,
these results may suggest that the attentional blink is a right-
hemisphere-related deficit. The intriguing implication is that by
shifting the balance toward the left hemisphere, the attentional
blink is reduced. It remains to be seen how this balance relates to
attentional blink performance in other clinical and nonclinical
populations. For instance, it has been found that both adults and
children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder—believed to
be a dopamine-related impairment—show a deeper and/or more
protracted attentional blink (Hollingsworth, McAuliffe, & Knowl-
ton, 2001; Mason, Humphreys, & Kent, 2005).
Relation to Other Findings
In a recent study, Akyu¨rek and Hommel (2005) investigated the
effects of short-term memory load on the attentional blink in a
design very similar to the design we used in Experiment 1. The
rationale of their experiments was that if attentional blink perfor-
mance depends on short-term memory processes (as is held by
some existing theories), then memory load should affect the mag-
nitude of the attentional blink. Akyu¨rek and Hommel indeed found
that both T1 and T2 accuracy decreased with increasing memory
load. At first sight, this may appear inconsistent with our finding
that task-irrelevant mental activity is beneficial to attentional blink
performance, especially in Experiment 1, where we used a short-
term memory task. However, Akyu¨rek and Hommel found effects
of load only when the memory content was related to the items in
the stream (i.e., digits, letters, or science fiction characters). In a
condition in which memory content was unrelated to the contents
of the stream, T2 accuracy was overall highest at almost 90%, and
it was not affected by memory load. Note that in our Experiment
1, the to-be-remembered patterns were also unrelated to the RSVP
items. Moreover, Akyu¨rek and Hommel did not include a baseline
condition without an additional memory task, as this fell beyond
the purpose of their experiments. Together, these considerations
leave open the possibility that the presence of an additional task
may have had an overall beneficial effect on attentional blink
performance.
Our results are further corroborated by Arend, Johnston, and
Shapiro (in press), who found that the attentional blink was atten-
uated when the RSVP stream was embedded in a display contain-
ing distracting computer-simulated starfield motion. This suggests
that distraction within the same modality as the RSVP stream (i.e.,
the visual modality) also leads to improvements. Our findings also
shed new light on a report by Kristja´nsson and Nakayama (2002).
These authors conducted an attentional blink experiment in which
the distance between T1 and T2 was varied not only in time (i.e.,
lag), but also in space, because the two targets could appear at
different locations within multiple RSVP streams. The interesting
finding was that the attentional blink was more attenuated (by as
much as 16%) with increasing spatial distance between the targets.
Performance for T2 was worst when it appeared in the same
location (i.e., the same stream) as T1. Kristja´nsson and Nakayama
(2002) interpreted these results as reflecting an inhibitory annulus
surrounding T1, such that streams close to T1 were suppressed.
The overinvestment hypothesis offers an alternative explanation:
The attentional blink may be the result of a localized overinvest-
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ment of resources, resulting in T2 being overwritten by spuriously
active distractors. This investment is likely to be highest for the
streams that contain or are close to T1. The more distant streams
may benefit from a more moderate amount of attention. Thus, both
Kristja´nsson and Nakayama’s results and Arend et al.’s results are
consistent with the idea that attentional blink performance may
improve when attention is more spatially distributed.
The finding that a mild degree of distraction may sometimes
improve cognitive performance is not new. For example, Thomp-
son, Schellenberg, and Husain (2001) found that listening to
Mozart improved performance on a spatial task, a finding that they
attributed to the effects of positive affect and increased arousal.
Furthermore, professional golfers have been shown to improve
their putting performance when simultaneously performing an
auditory discrimination task as compared with when they are fully
concentrating on playing golf (Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, &
Starkes, 2002). Kuhl and Kaze´n (1999) found reduced interference
in a Stroop task under positive-affect conditions (as induced by
emotionally laden prime words), but only when the participants
had to perform another task in addition.
The overinvestment hypothesis also bears some relationship to
the perceptual load theory of Lavie (1995). Lavie found that an
easy perceptual task suffers relatively more than a difficult per-
ceptual task from distracting information. According to Lavie, this
is because observers, in principle, invest all attentional resources
available in the task. In the easy task, not all these resources are
necessary, and some attention will spill over to the distractors. The
distractors are then processed up to a relatively high level where
they interfere with the task. It would be interesting to see if
interference can be reduced, and performance improved, by forc-
ing observers to divert attention away from the central task—just
as we have done in the RSVP paradigm.
Of further relevance to the present investigation is a visual
search study by Smilek, Enns, Eastwood, and Merikle (in press).
They found that a relatively difficult search improved (in terms of
search function slopes as well as overall response times) when
observers adopted a passive search mode, in which they were
instructed “to be as receptive as possible” and let the target just
“pop into their minds” (Smilek et al., in press). Notably, Smilek et
al. also found improvements in search efficiency (as indicated by
slopes but not by overall response times in this case) when the
search task was accompanied by an additional short-term memory
task. They concluded that search benefits from a shifting of cog-
nitive strategy from a reliance on slow executive control processes
to a reliance on rapid automatic attentional orienting processes.
Once more, we believe this interpretation is consistent with what
we have referred to as a more diffuse mental state, in which
observers are more explorative and more susceptible to multiple
inputs.
Finally, and perhaps closest to our own study, we mention an
early observation by Kahneman (1973), whose participants were
presented with a rapid series of words to each ear, from which they
were required to detect several target words: “The phenomenology
of the situation is suggestive: subjects report that they deliberately
refrain from paying particular attention to any word, because they
realize that doing so involves ‘missing’ several other words” (p.
149).
Together, the above findings suggest an intriguing influence of
general mental state on simple cognitive processes. It will be a
difficult but exciting challenge to try to develop new concepts and
theories aimed at capturing this influence. In this article, we have
made a beginning at characterizing the effects of general mental
state on the temporal dynamics of attention.
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